Good idea, bad outcome: whatever happened to fixed-term parliaments? by Blick, Andrew
5/17/2017
Good idea, bad outcome: whatever happened to fixed-term
parliaments?
blogs.lse.ac.uk /politicsandpolicy/whatever-happened-to-fixed-term-parliaments/
The ease with which an early election has been called has raised questions about the purpose of
the Fixed-Term Parliaments Act. Andrew Blick outlines the key legal aspects that must be
reviewed – including the regular length of a parliament – so that the public will still get to elect their
MPs relatively frequently, but not on a timetable that suits the politicians of the day.
The 2015 Parliament has abruptly ceased to exist. The General Election scheduled for May 2020
has been brought forward to 8 June 2017. It would be possible to mount a case that there was no
pressing need for this early poll, other than the political convenience of the Prime Minister,
subsequently endorsed by the House of Commons supermajority, also for political reasons. The Conservatives had
a working majority. No particular dire circumstance or new crisis had appeared. It certainly seems to be the case that
Theresa May saw an opportunity to expand her majority in the Commons and exert greater influence over the Lords,
especially over Brexit. She also hoped to secure her own personal mandate and obtain the authority she will need to
discipline her party if one or more of the factions inside it decides it is unhappy with the course taken by Brexit
negotiations.
The credibility of claims that a General Election can bolster the national interest could also be challenged. There is
no reason to suppose that the EU will have much interest in our election results when commencing talks with the
UK. It is unclear why our European neighbours would be more disposed to make substantial concessions simply
because the Conservatives have achieved the victory for which May hopes. Opposition MPs, too, endorsed the
early poll to a large extent for reasons of political expedience, though of a defensive nature. To do otherwise would
have appeared weak. The power of initiative rested with May; they complied with it, whatever misgivings they might
have had privately.
From this perspective, an important motive for this poll was domestic management. To make this observation is not
necessarily to criticise May. She is, after all, a party politician and can be expected to act as such. The rules of the
game have made it possible for this election to take place when it has. So if there is a fault, it is in the system itself.
But a problem certainly exists. General elections are arguably the most important exercises in democracy in this
country. Their timing should not be subordinated to party political requirements in the way they arguably have been
in 2017. This kind of abuse was not supposed to be possible any longer. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011
(FTPA) was presented as a means of removing inappropriate discretion over election timing from the Prime Minister.
Advocates of constitutional reform had long supported the idea of a change along these lines. The advent of this
election, then, suggests the FTPA is an example of how a good idea can lead to a bad outcome, if mishandled.
1/3
So what went wrong and what should be done about it? The failure of the FTPA to insulate our electoral cycle from
party political manipulation is partly explained by the influence of those same party political forces. The Act was a
crucial component of the coalition deal struck in May 2010. It added a degree of stability to the new government, in
particular providing the Liberal Democrats with a guarantee against a sudden decision by the Conservatives to
withdraw from the administration and bring about an early Dissolution. Consequently, there was a powerful interest
in ensuring a swift passage onto the statute book for what became the FTPA.
Warnings were given. To select one example, the House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform
Committee (PCRC), tried to secure the opportunity for full scrutiny of a draft bill. The proposed change, after all,
was one of historic importance to our constitution. It entailed a significant change in the rules regarding how the
membership of the House of Commons is determined. Reforms of this kind do not take place very often; and when
they do they should be approached with full consideration and attention to proper process. On this occasion, no
such diligence was permitted. The self-imposed government timetable precluded any delay. PCRC was able to hold
only one oral evidence session on the Bill (supplemented by 6 written submissions).
In its resulting report, published in September 2010, the PCRC concluded that there were significant possible
arguments of principle in favour of fixed-term parliaments. They were:
The potential to ‘curtail’ the ability of prime ministers to trigger general elections at moments that suited them
and their parties;
The creation of more certainty and stability in the political timetable in a fashion beneficial both to Parliament
and the government. Fixed-term parliaments could, for instance, be beneficial to efforts to plan the legislative
timetable and parliamentary oversight of it;
A reduction of unhelpful ‘speculation’ about when general elections might take place;
Yet PCRC objected to the Bill itself, both its contents and the process used to produce it. It found that the legislation
was ‘ill-thought through’ and ‘rushed’, and regretted that it did not rest on ‘political consensus’. The report concluded
further that it was ‘unacceptable’ that the bringing forward of a bill of such complicated constitutional and legal
ramifications had not followed ‘prior consultation or pre-legislative scrutiny.’ Taking into account the defects it
identified, PCRC called ‘for this Bill to be returned to the drawing board and for a draft Bill to be produced.’ The
government did not heed the Committee. Consequently, a proper opportunity to identify and correct problems with
the Bill was denied.
Had political imperatives not precluded such scrutiny and consideration, a flaw in Section 2 (1) and 2 (2) of the FTPA
that has now become manifest might have been avoided. Under this part of the Act, an early General Election is
possible if two thirds of all MPs (including vacant seats) support a motion to this effect. The weakness here is that,
to create a genuine barrier to self-interested prime ministerial manipulation of the electoral cycle, the FTPA relies on
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the main opposition party in the Commons being willing to vote against an immediate poll. Our political culture
seems to lack the maturity necessary for this course of action to be considered palatable. No-one wants to be seen
to be afraid of a battle, even if its taking place is detrimental to the interests of the country and its democracy.
May, consequently, was able to secure the two-thirds of Commons support necessary to trigger an immediate
General Election with ease. There was, therefore, no need to probe a further possible deficiency in the 2011 Act.
Even if the Opposition resisted the political pressure to concede an early poll, potentially a government could obtain
an election through simple majority vote under the ‘no confidence’ procedure, as set out in Section 2 (3) – (5) of the
FTPA. It could inspire such vote against itself and then wait for the 14-day period prescribed in the Act to elapse.
During this time, were there no vote of ‘confidence’ in an administration, then an early election would take place.
From a presentational point of view it might seem odd for a government to seek an expression of a lack of
confidence in itself. But in some circumstances the party in office might judge the prospective gains to outweigh any
such negative impression.
This first actual and second potential flaw in the FTPA both require close attention if the valuable principles that the
Act was supposed to deliver upon are to be attained. Fortunately, the Act itself provides an opportunity to achieve
improvements in it. Section 7 (4) to Section 7 (6) requires the Prime Minister, between June and November 2020, to
establish a committee, a majority of whom must be MPs, to review the working of the Act and make
recommendations, possibly for amendment or repeal of the FTPA. When that Committee comes into being, it will
need to give close attention to circumstances surrounding the General Election of June 2017.
Possible solutions exist. For instance, Prof. Robert Blackburn of King’s College London is one of those who have
argued that, following an early election, the five-year clock should not be re-set. Were this model in force today, it
would mean that following the June 2017 General Election, the following poll would take place in May 2020, as
already planned. An early election might not necessarily offer the same potential party political gains in terms of
buying time in office as it can under the current FTPA.
This and other proposals should be given the attention in 2020 that they did not receive ten years previously. For
instance, while the 2017 General Election perhaps came too soon, the regular length of a Parliament anticipated in
the FTPA was perhaps too long. Four rather than five years might be a more appropriate interval between general
elections. The public should be able to elect their representatives relatively frequently, but not on a timetable that
suits politicians. More widely, perhaps we should consider whether there is a better way of carrying out systemic
change. We might thereby be able to correct flaws in constitutional legislation before rather than after the fact.
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